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knowledge and
modality
The prominence of the modalities (i.e., necessity and
contingency) in epistemological discussions is due to the
influence of Immanuel Kant (1965), who maintained
that:
(1) All knowledge of necessary propositions is a pri-
ori; and
(2) All propositions known a priori are necessary.
Saul Kripke (1971, 1980) renewed interest in Kant’s
account of the relationship between the a priori and the
necessary by arguing that some necessary propositions
are known a posteriori and some contingent propositions
are known a priori. A cogent assessment of the contro-
versy requires some preliminary clarification.
The distinction between necessary and contingent
propositions is metaphysical. A necessarily true (false)
proposition is one that is true (false) and cannot be false
(true). The distinction between a priori and a posteriori
knowledge is epistemic. S knows a priori that p just in
case: (a) S knows that p; and (b) S’s justification for
believing that p does not depend on experience. Condi-
tion (b) is controversial. On the traditional reading, (b) is
equivalent to (c): S’s belief that p is nonexperientially jus-
tified. Hilary Putnam (1983) and Philip Kitcher (1983),
however, argue that (b) is equivalent to (d): S’s belief that
p is nonexperientially justified and cannot be defeated by
experience. Albert Casullo (2003) rejects the Putnam-
Kitcher reading on the grounds that it yields an analysis
of a priori knowledge that excludes the possibility that
someone knows a posteriori a proposition that can be
known a priori.
The expression “knowledge of necessary proposi-
tions” in (1) is ambiguous. The following definitions
remove the ambiguity:
(A) S knows the general modal status of p just in case
S knows that p is a necessary proposition (i.e.,
either necessarily true or necessarily false) or S
knows that p is a contingent proposition (i.e.,
either contingently true or contingently false);
(B) S knows the truth value of p just in case S knows
that p is true or S knows that p is false (assuming
truth is always bivalent);
(C) S knows the specific modal status of p just in case
S knows that p is necessarily true or S knows that
p is necessarily false or S knows that p is contin-
gently true or S knows that p is contingently false.
KNOWLEDGE AND MODALITY
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
100 • 2 n d  e d i t i o n
eophil_K  11/2/05  3:40 PM  Page 100
(A) and (B) are logically independent. One can know that
Goldbach’s Conjecture is a necessary proposition but not
know whether it is true or false. Alternatively, one can
know that some mathematical proposition is true but not
know whether it is a necessary proposition or a contin-
gent proposition. (C), however, is not independent of (A)
and (B). One cannot know the specific modal status of a
proposition unless one knows both its general modal sta-
tus and its truth value.
(1) is crucial for Kant, because it is the leading prem-
ise of his only argument in support of the existence of a
priori knowledge:
(1) All knowledge of necessary propositions is a pri-
ori.
(3) Mathematical propositions, such as that 7 + 5 =
12, are necessary.
(4) Therefore, knowledge of mathematical proposi-
tions, such as that 7 + 5 = 12, is a priori.
(1), however, is ambiguous. There are two ways of read-
ing it:
(1T) All knowledge of the truth value of necessary
propositions is a priori, or
(1G) All knowledge of the general modal status of nec-
essary propositions is a priori.
The argument is valid only if (1) is read as (1T). Kant,
however, supports (1) with the observation that although
experience teaches that something is so and so, it does not
teach us that it cannot be otherwise. Taken at face value,
this observation states that experience teaches us that a
proposition is true and that experience does not teach us
that it is necessary. This supports (1G), not (1T).
Kripke rejects (1) by offering examples of necessary
truths that are alleged to be known a posteriori. First, he
maintains that if P is an identity statement between
names, such as “Hesperus = Phosphorus,” or a statement
asserting that an object has an essential property, such as
“This table is made of wood,” then one knows a priori
that:
(5) If P then necessarily P.
Second, he argues that because one knows by empirical
investigation that Hesperus = Phosphorus and that this
table is made of wood, one knows a posteriori that:
(6) P.
Kripke concludes that one knows by modus ponens that:
(7) Necessarily P.
(7) is known a posteriori because it is based on (6), which
is known a posteriori.
How do Kripke’s examples bear on (1)? Once again,
a distinction must be made between (1G) and (1T).
Kripke’s examples, if cogent, establish that (1T) is false:
They establish that one knows a posteriori that some nec-
essary propositions are true. They do not, however, estab-
lish that (1G) is false: They do not establish that one
knows a posteriori that some necessary propositions are
necessary. It may appear that Kripke’s conclusion that one
has a posteriori knowledge that necessarily P entails that
(1G) is false. Here a distinction must be made between
(1G) and:
(1S) All knowledge of the specific modal status of nec-
essary propositions is a priori.
Kripke’s examples establish that (1S) is false: They estab-
lish that one knows a posteriori that some necessary
propositions are necessarily true. Because knowledge of
the specific modal status of a proposition is the conjunc-
tion of knowledge of its general modal status and knowl-
edge of its truth value, it follows from the fact that one’s
knowledge of the truth value of P is a posteriori that one’s
knowledge of its specific modal status is also a posteriori.
However, from the fact that one’s knowledge of the spe-
cific modal status of P is a posteriori, it does not follow
that one’s knowledge of its general modal status is also a
posteriori.
(1G) has not gone unchallenged. Kitcher (1983)
argues that even if knowledge of the general modal status
of propositions is justified by nonexperiential evidence,
such as the results of abstract reasoning or thought exper-
iments, it does not follow that such knowledge is a priori
because the nonexperiential justification in question can
be defeated by experience. Casullo (2003) rejects (1G) on
the grounds that the Kantian contention that experience
can provide knowledge of only the actual world overlooks
the fact that much practical and scientific knowledge
involves counterfactual conditionals, which provide
information that goes beyond what is true of the actual
world.
Kripke also argues that some contingent truths are
known a priori. His examples are based on the observa-
tion that a definite description can be employed to fix the
reference—as opposed to give the meaning—of a term.
Consider someone who employs the definition descrip-
tion “the length of S at t0” to fix the reference of the
expression “one meter.” Kripke maintains that this person
knows, without further empirical investigation, that S is
one meter long at t0. Yet the statement is contingent
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because “one meter” rigidly designates the length that is
in fact the length of S at t0 but, under different conditions,
S would have had a different length at t0. In reply, Alvin
Plantinga (1974) and Keith Donnellan (1979) contend
that, without empirical investigation, the reference fixer
knows that the sentence “S is one meter long at t0”
expresses a truth, though not the truth that it expresses.
Gareth Evans (1979) disputes this contention.
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knowledge and truth,
the value of
Questions concerning the value of knowledge and truth
range from those that suggest complete skepticism about
such value to those that reflect more discriminating con-
cerns about the precise nature of the value in question
and the comparative judgment that one of the two is
more valuable than the other.
the comparative question and
the pragmatic account
The history of epistemology has its conceptual roots in
the dialogues of Plato, and the question of the value of
knowledge and truth arises there as well. In Plato’s Meno,
Socrates and Meno discuss a number of issues, including
the issue of the nature and value of knowledge. Socrates
raises the question of the value of knowledge, and Meno
answers by proposing a pragmatic theory: knowledge is
valuable because it gets us what we want. Socrates imme-
diately proposes a counterexample, to the effect that true
opinion would work just as well: If you want to get to
Larissa, hiring a guide who has a true opinion of how to
get there will have the same practical results as hiring a
guide who knows the way. Meno then voices a philosoph-
ically deep perplexity, wondering aloud why knowledge
should be more prized than true opinion and whether
there is any difference between the two. Meno thus ques-
tions two assumptions, the first being the assumption
that knowledge is more valuable than true opinion, and
the second that knowledge is something more than true
opinion.
Socrates’s counterexample suggests another: If you
want to get to Larissa, it matters not whether your guide
has true opinion or merely empirically adequate views on
the matter. To see the counterexample, we need to under-
stand that an empirically adequate theory is one that
“saves the appearances,” in other words, one that would
never be refuted by any sensory experience. The simplest
way to see that such a theory is not the same thing as a
true theory is to consider skeptical scenarios such as René
Descartes’s evil demon world. The denizens of such a
world will have roughly the same views as we do, and
their views will be as empirically adequate as ours. Since
the demon is so skillful at carrying out his intentions,
however, their views will be false even if ours are true. In
such a world, there are no guides with true opinions
about how to get to Larissa. Instead, the best one could
hope for is a guide who has an empirically adequate view
of the matter. Yet, if we compare the two situations, the
one in the actual world where the hired guide has a true
opinion, and the one in the demon world where the hired
guide has only an empirically adequate opinion, no suf-
fering accrues to the traveler in the demon world that
does not also accrue to the traveler in the actual world,
and no benefits are experienced by the traveler in the
demon world that are not also experienced by the traveler
in the actual world. That is to say, their experiences are
indistinguishable, leaving us to wonder what practical
advantage truth has over empirical adequacy.
skepticism about the value of
knowledge and truth
Besides this Platonic threat to the value of knowledge and
truth, there are other threats. One arises from the specter
of skepticism. If we grant that there is no adequate answer
to the skeptic, we might have the experience of philo-
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